Did it or did it not happen?  An apparent attack on two US Navy ships, the Maddox and C.Turner Joy, on August 4, 1964 remains a hotly debated mystery.  It’s important to understand this event because it was the door opener to greater U.S. involvement in Vietnam.  Just what happened in the Gulf of Tonkin in early August, 1964?

On July 30, 1964 South Vietnamese pilots attacked two islands off the coast of North Vietnam in the Gulf of Tonkin.  The North Vietnamese assumed U.S. involvement. The USNS Maddox on August 2nd, 1964 was patrolling in the Gulf of Tonkin outside North Vietnam’s territorial waters when three North Vietnamese torpedo boats approached at high speed.  Warning shots did not stop the attack, so the Maddox destroyed one of the boats and damaged a second. Two fired torpedoes missed the Maddox by 200 yards.  Noting that there were no U.S. casualties or major damage to the ships, President Johnson put the Navy on alert and sent the C. Turner Joy to join the Maddox in the gulf, but otherwise gave no orders for retaliation.

Two nights later there was a storm in the Gulf of Tonkin that was so severe it made it difficult to see or hear. The storm also played havoc with the radar on the ships.  An inexperienced Maddox radar man believed he saw five torpedo boats 36 miles away headed directly for his ship and alerted his Captain, John Herrick.  Both Herrick and the captain of the C. Turner Joy decided to take no chances with the safety of their men.  They called for air support and began to commence firing. Initial reports from the ships indicated two boats were sunk and two were damaged. However, no torpedo boats were seen by crew members of the ships, and pilots of flight missions, including the highly respected James Stockdale, reported no sightings of boats or wreckage.  Conflicting messages were relayed to Washington and Captain Herrick called for a more complete review of the situation before retaliatory action was taken.  Captain Herrick’s review with his men provided further confusion and even his reports relayed to Washington were mixed messages.  Still, one message from Captain Herrick and another from Admiral Sharp indicated an ambush had occurred, but no details were given.

President Johnson met with Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and others  to review their options and decided upon a retaliatory strike.  The strike was approved and 64 sorties were flown, damaging patrol boats and oil refineries along the coast of North Vietnam.  More importantly, following this incident President Johnson proposed what came to be called the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. This resolution gave the president the authority to take any action, including military force, he deemed necessary to repel
any armed attack against the United States or to assist any member of the Southeast
Asia Treaty Organization, including South Vietnam.  This critical resolution, presented to Congress based on conflicting reports and unclear information, essentially gave the president the right to make war without a declaration of war.  Congress approved the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution on August 11, 1964 with 98% approval in the Senate and 100% approval in the House.

Be it a resolution, a law, or a school rule it is important to remember the spirit behind a proposal and the reason it was put into effect.  Although the wording of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution gave the president wide authority to make war, the spirit of the resolution -- its intent -- was to show support for the president and to give the president the authority to respond to aggression, but it was also understood that he would seek congressional approval before taking further major actions.

Within 7 months of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, Lyndon Johnson had been elected President, sustained bombing of North Vietnam began, and the first American ground forces landed in Danang, South Vietnam.  President Johnson used the Tonkin Gulf Resolution to eventually place over half a million ground forces in South Vietnam.  As a result of our forces growing significantly, American casualties grew rapidly, as well.

Debates still swirl around the events of August, 1964.  Did it or did it not happen?  Intelligence reports and historical reviews of the Gulf of Tonkin incident indicate that there was likely no attack against the Maddox and C. Turner Joy on the evening of August 4, 1964.  Both North Vietnam’s Defense Minister, Vo Nguyen Giap and former U.S. Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara agree that the attack did not occur.

Debate is also still contentious about the Tonkin Gulf Resolution and its subsequent use to make war.  Clearly, President Johnson should not have used the resolution to escalate America’s involvement without further consultation and support from Congress. Members of Congress were not deceived by President Johnson, rather it seems they misunderstood the gravity of the situation in Vietnam.  It’s popular today for former congressmen and women to say they were against the war, but where were they?  Congress waited until 1973 to pass the War Powers Act, which prevents a president from committing our troops without approval from Congress.  Why they waited so long seems to wreak of politics. Just where was Congress?  If they were truly against the war, why weren’t they strong enough to rescind the resolution before 500,000 men and women were sent to Vietnam?  Did they lack the will to prevent the war?  Did they have a better solution for what was happening in Vietnam?

Article 1, section 8 of the Constitution gives Congress the ability to declare war, raise and support armies, provide and maintain a navy, make rules for our forces, etc.  Still,  Article 2, section 2 makes the President the commander in chief.  Debate over whether the President had the legal authority to conduct a war without a declaration will continue for many years, but the key points to remember at this time are the intent of the resolution, its unjustified use, and the absence of a strong Congress.   These issues are far more important than what an inexperienced radar man saw on a stormy night in the Gulf of Tonkin in 1964.
 

Does this situation affect how we handle our military today?  Yes.  In 1990, prior to sending troops into the Gulf War, President Bush explained the mission and obtained the support of Congress.